You can get some of that in this thread.Sam Vega wrote:The "Knowing/seeing" issue gets more interesting the more I think about it. Are there any Pali scholars who could elaborate on the terms used in the Sutta ("Knowing" and "Seeing")?
SN 12.17 Acela Sutta: To the Clothless Ascetic
Re: SN 12.17 Acela Sutta: To the Clothless Ascetic
- "And how is it, bhikkhus, that by protecting oneself one protects others? By the pursuit, development, and cultivation of the four establishments of mindfulness. It is in such a way that by protecting oneself one protects others.
"And how is it, bhikkhus, that by protecting others one protects oneself? By patience, harmlessness, goodwill, and sympathy. It is in such a way that by protecting others one protects oneself.
- Sedaka Sutta [SN 47.19]
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Re: SN 12.17 Acela Sutta: To the Clothless Ascetic
Greetings Mike,
The very reason the arahant knows that jati is ended is because they personally know paticcasamuppada and have personally eradicated avijja. So it is seen here-and-now. It is seen here-and-now that there is the remainderless cessation of avijja, and thus, the arahant therefore knows that jati has ended. The confidence lies in understanding the steadfastness and universality of paticcasamuppada... thus, the house-builder is destroyed.
Metta,
Retro.
I cannot accept your conclusion here, as it is a false distinction being drawn.mikenz66 wrote:In any case, my point is that he's talking about confidence a about something in the future, not the "all has to be seen in the present moment..." line that Ven Nanavira seems to take.
The very reason the arahant knows that jati is ended is because they personally know paticcasamuppada and have personally eradicated avijja. So it is seen here-and-now. It is seen here-and-now that there is the remainderless cessation of avijja, and thus, the arahant therefore knows that jati has ended. The confidence lies in understanding the steadfastness and universality of paticcasamuppada... thus, the house-builder is destroyed.
He knows the Truth of Dukkha, and because He knows the Truth of Dukkha, He does not suffer.mikenz66 wrote:Which is very much to the point of what some of these lines mean. Does "I know dukkha..." mean "I know about dukkha because I used to suffer", or "I am still experiencing dukkha."?
Metta,
Retro.
"Whatever is true, whatever is noble, whatever is right, whatever is pure, whatever is lovely, whatever is admirable—if anything is excellent or praiseworthy—think about such things."
Re: SN 12.17 Acela Sutta: To the Clothless Ascetic
Hi Retro,
Mike
Sure. Opinions about that point obviously differ. As one would expect...retrofuturist wrote:Greetings Mike,
I cannot accept your conclusion here, as it is a false distinction being drawn.mikenz66 wrote:In any case, my point is that he's talking about confidence a about something in the future, not the "all has to be seen in the present moment..." line that Ven Nanavira seems to take.
Mike
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Re: SN 12.17 Acela Sutta: To the Clothless Ascetic
Greetings Mike,
Differences in opinion need not necessarily give rise to suffering.
Metta,
Retro.
Do you actually disagree then with the paragraph that followed the sentence you quoted, or did you stop there and disengage, holding the remainder of my post at arm's length with platitudes, preferring not to investigate and understand the basis for the disagreement?mikenz66 wrote:Sure. Opinions about that point obviously differ. As one would expect...
Differences in opinion need not necessarily give rise to suffering.
Metta,
Retro.
"Whatever is true, whatever is noble, whatever is right, whatever is pure, whatever is lovely, whatever is admirable—if anything is excellent or praiseworthy—think about such things."
Re: SN 12.17 Acela Sutta: To the Clothless Ascetic
Yes. Knowing something doesn't have to mean that what is known has completely played itself out.retrofuturist wrote:Greetings Mike,
Do you actually disagree then with the paragraph that followed the sentence you quoted,...mikenz66 wrote:Sure. Opinions about that point obviously differ. As one would expect...
I (and a number of others) have disagreed with that interpretation for a long time, and I don't see us coming to an agreement any time soon.
But this is all meta-discussion. Perhaps we could return to some of the issues of the Acela Sutta.
Mike
Re: SN 12.17 Acela Sutta: To the Clothless Ascetic
"[If one thinks] 'The one who actsis the same as the one who experiences [the result]', [then one asserts] weith reference to one existing from the beginning: 'Suffering is created by oneself'. When one asserts thus, this amounts to eternalism."
BB gives some technical discussion of exactly how to translate this...
Spk: If at the beginning (one thinks), "The one who acts is the same as the one who experiences (the result)," in such a case the belief afterwards follows, "Suffering is created by oneself." And here, what is meant by suffering is the suffering of the round (vattadukkha). Asserting this, from the beginning one declares eternalism, one grasps hold of eternalism. Why? Because that view of his amounts to this. Eternalism comes upon one who conceives teh agent and the experiencer to be one and the same.
Spk-pt: Prior to the belief that suffering is created by oneself there are the distortions of perception and of mind (sannacittavipallasa) in the notion, "The one who acts is the same as the one who experiences (the result)," and then a wrong adherence to these distortions develops, namely, the belief "Suffering is created by oneself" (a distortion of views, ditthivipallasa).
On the three levels of distortion with their four modes, see AN II 52.
AN 4.49 Vipallasa Sutta: Distortions of the Mind
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .olen.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;
BB gives some technical discussion of exactly how to translate this...
Spk: If at the beginning (one thinks), "The one who acts is the same as the one who experiences (the result)," in such a case the belief afterwards follows, "Suffering is created by oneself." And here, what is meant by suffering is the suffering of the round (vattadukkha). Asserting this, from the beginning one declares eternalism, one grasps hold of eternalism. Why? Because that view of his amounts to this. Eternalism comes upon one who conceives teh agent and the experiencer to be one and the same.
Spk-pt: Prior to the belief that suffering is created by oneself there are the distortions of perception and of mind (sannacittavipallasa) in the notion, "The one who acts is the same as the one who experiences (the result)," and then a wrong adherence to these distortions develops, namely, the belief "Suffering is created by oneself" (a distortion of views, ditthivipallasa).
On the three levels of distortion with their four modes, see AN II 52.
AN 4.49 Vipallasa Sutta: Distortions of the Mind
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .olen.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;
Sensing no change in the changing,
Sensing pleasure in suffering,
Assuming "self" where there's no self,
Sensing the un-lovely as lovely -
Gone astray with wrong views,
beings Mis-perceive with distorted minds.
Re: SN 12.17 Acela Sutta: To the Clothless Ascetic
"[If one thinks] 'The one who acts is one, the one who experiences [the result] is another,' [then one asserts] with reference to one stricken by feeling: 'Suffering is created by another.' When one asserts thus, this amounts to annihilationism."
[More comments from BB on the language and how the Commentary interprets it...]
Spk: If at the beginning (one thinks) "The one who acts is one, the one who experiences (the result) is another," ins such a case afterwards there comes the belief, "Suffering is created by another," held by one stricken by --- that is, pierced by --- the feeling associated with the annihilationist view that arises thus: 'The agent is annihilated right here, and someone else ('another') experiences (the results) of his deeds. Asserting thus, from the beginning one declares annihilationism, one grasps hold of annihilationism. Why? Because the view one holds amounts to this. Annihilationism comes upon him.
[More comments from BB on the language and how the Commentary interprets it...]
Spk: If at the beginning (one thinks) "The one who acts is one, the one who experiences (the result) is another," ins such a case afterwards there comes the belief, "Suffering is created by another," held by one stricken by --- that is, pierced by --- the feeling associated with the annihilationist view that arises thus: 'The agent is annihilated right here, and someone else ('another') experiences (the results) of his deeds. Asserting thus, from the beginning one declares annihilationism, one grasps hold of annihilationism. Why? Because the view one holds amounts to this. Annihilationism comes upon him.
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Re: SN 12.17 Acela Sutta: To the Clothless Ascetic
Greetings,
That would seem to be what the "this amounts to" terminology bolded above is pointing to.
Metta,
Retro.
I wonder... is it implicit in self-view, that there is some framing with respect to that self in terms of what happens to it in the past, present and future? In other words, from the root/basic self-view comes (some flavour of) eternalism or annihilationism, and that one of the 62 eternalist/annihilationist views outlined in the Brahmajala are necessary consequences of the root view of self?"[If one thinks] 'The one who acts is the same as the one who experiences [the result]', [then one asserts] with reference to one existing from the beginning: 'Suffering is created by oneself'. When one asserts thus, this amounts to eternalism."....
"[If one thinks] 'The one who acts is one, the one who experiences [the result] is another,' [then one asserts] with reference to one stricken by feeling: 'Suffering is created by another.' When one asserts thus, this amounts to annihilationism."
That would seem to be what the "this amounts to" terminology bolded above is pointing to.
Metta,
Retro.
"Whatever is true, whatever is noble, whatever is right, whatever is pure, whatever is lovely, whatever is admirable—if anything is excellent or praiseworthy—think about such things."
Re: SN 12.17 Acela Sutta: To the Clothless Ascetic
Indeed, in all cases I can recall it's not really the past or future that are the problem.
See, for example, MN 131 http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .nana.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false; where conceiving about a self in the past, future, or present, is the problem. Perhaps the current Sutta benefits from comparison with that one.
Mike
See, for example, MN 131 http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .nana.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false; where conceiving about a self in the past, future, or present, is the problem. Perhaps the current Sutta benefits from comparison with that one.
Mike
Re: SN 12.17 Acela Sutta: To the Clothless Ascetic
"Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathagata teaches the Dhamma by the middle. 'With ignorance as condition, volitional formations...'"
Spk: The Tathagata teaches the Dhamma by the middle without veering to either of these extremens --- eternalism or annihilationism --- having abandoned them without reservation. He teaches while being established in the middle way. What is that Dhamma? By the formula of dependent origination, the effect is shown to occur through the cause and to cease with the cessation of the cause, but no agent or experiencer (karaka, vedaka) is described.
Spk: The Tathagata teaches the Dhamma by the middle without veering to either of these extremens --- eternalism or annihilationism --- having abandoned them without reservation. He teaches while being established in the middle way. What is that Dhamma? By the formula of dependent origination, the effect is shown to occur through the cause and to cease with the cessation of the cause, but no agent or experiencer (karaka, vedaka) is described.
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Re: SN 12.17 Acela Sutta: To the Clothless Ascetic
Possible explanations, butvinasp wrote:Hi Mike,
"It it not that I do not know and see suffering, Kassapa. I know suffering, I see suffering."
My interpretation of this is that it can be understood in two ways.
!. The Buddha remembers what suffering is like, from his life before
his awakening.
2. The Buddha knows and sees suffering in other people, almost everyone
that he encounters - including Kassapa.
Regards, Vincent.
3. The Buddha is still suffering.
You know he said, old age is suffering. The BUddha still had to die. Dying is suffering. It may all be bodily suffering and not mental, but it is still suffering and it arose from the same process of dependent origination.
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Re: SN 12.17 Acela Sutta: To the Clothless Ascetic
Greetings,
Retro.
Alternatively, from the Vinaya...reflection wrote:The BUddha still had to die. Dying is suffering. It may all be bodily suffering and not mental, but it is still suffering and it arose from the same process of dependent origination.
And the Suttas...MV 1.6 wrote:Upaka: Do you mean to say that you claim to have won victory over birth and death?
Buddha: Indeed friend I am a Victorious One; and now, in this world of the spiritually blind, I go to Benares to beat the drum of Deathlessness."
SN 12.17 (retrofuturist translation) wrote:From personal identification as a requisite condition, then aging & death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair come into play. Such is the origination of this entire mass of stress & suffering.
AN 10.60 (retrofuturist translation) wrote:This truly is the most peaceful and refined, that is to say, the stilling of all formations, the foresaking of all acquisitions, and every substratum of identification, the fading away of craving, cessation, nibbana.
Metta,MN 26 wrote:"... the unborn, unageing, unailing, deathless, sorrowless, undefiled supreme security from bondage."
Retro.
"Whatever is true, whatever is noble, whatever is right, whatever is pure, whatever is lovely, whatever is admirable—if anything is excellent or praiseworthy—think about such things."
Re: SN 12.17 Acela Sutta: To the Clothless Ascetic
Could anyone please explain why this is "by the middle", as opposed to being a new way, a third view, an alternative conception, etc?"Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathagata teaches the Dhamma by the middle. 'With ignorance as condition, volitional formations...'"
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Re: SN 12.17 Acela Sutta: To the Clothless Ascetic
Greetings Sam,
In this case, the Middle Way dissects...
'Existing from the very beginning, stress is self-made.' and 'For one existing harassed by feeling, stress is other-made.'
In the suttas there are many examples of "extremes" which the Middle Way enables one to navigate through.
Metta,
Retro.
In this case, the Middle Way dissects...
'Existing from the very beginning, stress is self-made.' and 'For one existing harassed by feeling, stress is other-made.'
In the suttas there are many examples of "extremes" which the Middle Way enables one to navigate through.
Metta,
Retro.
"Whatever is true, whatever is noble, whatever is right, whatever is pure, whatever is lovely, whatever is admirable—if anything is excellent or praiseworthy—think about such things."
Re: SN 12.17 Acela Sutta: To the Clothless Ascetic
Hi Retro,retrofuturist wrote:Greetings Sam,
In this case, the Middle Way dissects...
'Existing from the very beginning, stress is self-made.' and 'For one existing harassed by feeling, stress is other-made.'
In the suttas there are many examples of "extremes" which the Middle Way enables one to navigate through.
Metta,
Retro.
Yes, I am familiar with the idea of the Middle Way enabling one to navigate between extremes, but cannot in this case see why the (fairly standard) formula of paticcasamuppada constitutes a Middle Way. Does paticcasamuppada somehow embody aspects of both Eternalism and Annihilationism? They seem to be mutually exclusive positions, and therefore subject to the law of excluded middle. Paticcasamuppada seems to be looking at something else, rather than the two wrong views or some position midway between them.