A quibble about Buddhadasa's teaching

Exploring the Dhamma, as understood from the perspective of the ancient Pali commentaries.
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robertk
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A quibble about Buddhadasa's teaching

Post by robertk »

One member wrote that people sometimes quibble about the writings of modern teachers and mentioned that it is worse when people misunderstand such luminary as Buddhadasa.

I picked up a copy of Paticcasamuppada - Practical Dependent Origination by Ven. Buddhadasa Bhikkhu (of Thailand)


I'd like to begin with these comments from the venerable Buddhadasa's book. He writes that p. 6



"...
therefore teaching Paticcasamupada in such a way that there is a self persisting over a series of lives is contrary to the principle of dependent origination."
This is, of course, evident to anyone who has had even a cursory look at the Tipitaka; anatta is really the bedrock of Dhamma. However, in the next sentence he says that


"dependent origination is on no way concerned with morality which must depend upon a theory of Eternalism".

This I don't follow. Kamma is simply a conditioned phenomenon - and it is just natural law that certain types of action lead to certain results. We can think of this as a moral law without evoking any self. In the following paragraph p.6 he says that an incorrectly explained theory has been taught for a thousand years. On p8 he explains with regard to this that the


"during the time the commentaries were composed there arose a widespread tendency to explain matters of ultimate truths in terms of the Eternalist theory."

He lays the blame for all this on Buddhaghosa (ancient composer of the Visuddhimagga and many important commentaries) p8
."the same person who collected all the commentaries together so that total blind acceptance..will allow only one voice to be heard."
He is not sure how this wrongview arose but he speculates that it either happened because of lack of insight OR he thinks that it was a deliberate plot to destroy Buddhism for Brahmins who believed in atta (self)see page 51-52. He notes that there is no written evidence before the time of the Visuddhimagga [written by Buddhaghosa] where Paticcasamupada was explained wrongly. And that at the time of the third council (long before Buddhaghosa ) if one had "
said there was a self that spun around in the cycle of birth and death and rebirth as in the case of Bhikkhu Sati he was held to be holding wrong views in the sense of Eternalism and was made to leave the order."
He equates such wrong views with the Visuddhimagga.

He does kindly note that Buddhaghosa p60 "is a man of great knowledge." He then says,



"
BUT I don't agree with him at all regarding Dependent Origination because he spoke of it in terms of a soul and so it became Brahministic."

And he carries on (p63) to note that he
"is not going to defile of defame or villify
Buddhaghosa..I only want to make some observations. Buddhaghosa was born a Brahmin..and he completed a study of the three vedas like any other Brahmin. His spirit was that of a Brahmin..if he later came to explain the Buddhist theory of Dependent Origination as a form of Brahminism it is most reasonable to supsect that he was careless and forgetful so that he cannot be considered to be an Arahat."

So to sum up venerable Buddhadasa is suggesting that Buddhaghosa taught an Eternalistic (self, atta) version of the Paticcasamuppada. Is that true? I think it is best to let the ancient texts speak for themselves.
From the relevant section of the Visuddhimagga Chapter XV11 Dependent origination 113:

"but how does a man who is confused about these things perform these three kinds of formations? Firstly, when he is confused about death, instead of taking death thus 'death in every case is break up of aggregates(khandas, not-self)' he figures that it is lasting being's transmigration to another incarnation and so on".

115 "when he is confused about the round of rebirths, instead of taking the round of rebirths as pictured thus: 'an endless chain of aggregates(khandas) of elements(dhatus) bases(ayatanas) that carries on unbrokenly is what is called 'the round or rebirths' he figures that it is a lasting being that goes from this world to another world, that comes from another world to this world."

117 "when he is confused about independently-arisen states, instead of taking the occurence of formations to be due to ignorance etc., he figures that it is a self that knows or does not know, that acts and causes action..."

161 "a mere state that has got its conditions ushers in the ensuing existence; While it does not migrate from the past, with no cause in the past it is not. So a mere material and immaterial state, arisen when it has obtained its conditions, that is spoken of, saying that it comes into the next becoming; it is not a lasting being, not a soul. And it has neither transmigrated from the past nor yet is it manifested here without cause from that . . ."

273 "Becomings wheel reveals no known beginning; no maker, no experiencer there; Void with a twelve-fold voidness,"

313 "one who sees this rightly abandons the self view by understanding the absence of a maker. One who sees it wrongly clings to the moral -inefficacy of action view because he does not perceive that the causative function of ignorance etc us established as a law.."

314 "and so let a wise man with mindfulness so practice that he may begin to find a footing in the deeps of the dependent origination"
Now another point about the book. On page 62 Venerable Buddhadasa says that by explaining Paticcasamuppada as happening over several lives and suggesting that

"kamma in this life gives rise to results in some far off future life it as if there are no kammic results(vipaka) at all which we receive in the birth in which the deed was done.....to suggest that defilements and kamma from a past life become effective in this, a later life, is impossible"

Firstly, I'd like to say that truly there is no one who receives results but that results arise by conditions (just to be pedantic). From the Visuddhimagga
172"Experiencer is a convention for mere
arising of fruit (vipaka);"
Secondly he doesn't acknowledge that the commentaries (and tipitaka) say that the results of kamma can indeed arise in this life,..(or at the time of death or in future lives). They say it is pretty much unpredictable (except to the Buddha) when the results will arise because of the many other
conditions that support or impede kamma. Here is a quote from the Tipitaka:

" Threefold, however, is the fruit of karma: ripening
during the life-time (dittha-dhamma-vedaníya-kamma),
ripening in the next birth (upapajja-vedaníya-kamma),
ripening in later births (aparápariya-vedaníya kamma)
...." (A.VI, 63).
Element

Re: A quibble about Buddhadasa's teaching

Post by Element »

robertk wrote:From the relevant section of the Visuddhimagga Chapter XV11 Dependent origination 113:

"but how does a man who is confused about these things perform these three kinds of formations?
A man does not perform formations or kamma at the sankhara link. The three sankaras are not volitional actions or formations. The suttas state clearly the sankhara are three things, namely, in & out breathing, vitaka & vicara and perception & feeling. I recommend the study of MN 9 & 44.
115 "when he is confused about the round of rebirths, instead of taking the round of rebirths as pictured thus: 'an endless chain of aggregates(khandas) of elements(dhatus) bases(ayatanas) that carries on unbrokenly is what is called 'the round or rebirths' he figures that it is a lasting being that goes from this world to another world, that comes from another world to this world."
Buddhagosa is teaching an impersonal rebirth here. Buddha did not teach dependent origination like this. There is no "unbroken chain" in the Buddha's teachings.
117 "when he is confused about independently-arisen states, instead of taking the occurence of formations to be due to ignorance etc., he figures that it is a self that knows or does not know, that acts and causes action..."
There is no need for me to repeat Buddhagosa's conflict with the suttas regarding the link called sankhara.
161 "a mere state that has got its conditions ushers in the ensuing existence; While it does not migrate from the past, with no cause in the past it is not. So a mere material and immaterial state, arisen when it has obtained its conditions, that is spoken of, saying that it comes into the next becoming; it is not a lasting being, not a soul. And it has neither transmigrated from the past nor yet is it manifested here without cause from that . . ."
I do not wish to be rude but the above statement has no relevance whatsoever to dependent origination. Buddhagosa is talking about the origin of life rather than the origin of being. Being is the sense of 'self existence', "I am this", "I am that", etc.
273 "Becomings wheel reveals no known beginning; no maker, no experiencer there; Void with a twelve-fold voidness,"
The voidness here is nihilistic. Buddha never taught like this.

[EDIT: Off-topic comments relating to Buddhaghosa and Nagarjuna removed - Retro.]

We are so fortunate to have the suttas available to us today.

With metta

Element
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Dhammanando
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Re: A quibble about Buddhadasa's teaching

Post by Dhammanando »

Just a reminder that this is the Classical Theravada Forum. Here mere assertion won't do, and personal opinions not backed up by citations from the Tipitaka or its commentaries are of no interest. Lastly, the aforementioned texts are, for discussion purposes, assumed to be reliable.

Best wishes,
Dhammanando Bhikkhu
Yena yena hi maññanti,
tato taṃ hoti aññathā.


In whatever way they conceive it,
It turns out otherwise.
(Sn. 588)
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Dhammanando
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Re: A quibble about Buddhadasa's teaching

Post by Dhammanando »

Hi Element,
Element wrote:A man does not perform formations or kamma at the sankhara link. The three sankaras are not volitional actions or formations. The suttas state clearly the sankhara are three things, namely, in & out breathing, vitaka & vicara and perception & feeling. I recommend the study of MN 9 & 44.
MN. 9 offers no support for your view, for here the three types of sankhāra are named but not defined.

Neither does MN. 44, for here sankhāras are treated in a context that has nothing whatever to do with dependent arising. The sutta is concerned with the gradual pacification of sankhāras by one who enters saññāvedayita-nirodhasamāpatti.
Buddhagosa is teaching an impersonal rebirth here. Buddha did not teach dependent origination like this. There is no "unbroken chain" in the Buddha's teachings.
I suggest you take a look at the suttas in the Saṃyutta Nikāya's Jarāvagga.
There is no need for me to repeat Buddhagosa's conflict with the suttas regarding the link called sankhara.
This supposed conflicted is an unsupported assertion on your part.
I do not wish to be rude but the above statement has no relevance whatsoever to dependent origination. Buddhagosa is talking about the origin of life rather than the origin of being. Being is the sense of 'self existence', "I am this", "I am that", etc.
But only in Buddhadasa's teaching, not in the suttas:
  • "And what is being, what is the origin of being, what is the cessation of being, what is the way leading to the cessation of being? There are these three kinds of being: sense-sphere being, fine-material being, and immaterial being."
    (MN. 9)
In these three states of being there will be moments of conceiving "I am this", "I am that," and then there will be moments when nothing of the sort is happening.

Best wishes,
Dhammanando Bhikkhu
Yena yena hi maññanti,
tato taṃ hoti aññathā.


In whatever way they conceive it,
It turns out otherwise.
(Sn. 588)
Element

Re: A quibble about Buddhadasa's teaching

Post by Element »

Dhammanando wrote:
  • "And what is being, what is the origin of being, what is the cessation of being, what is the way leading to the cessation of being? There are these three kinds of being: sense-sphere being, fine-material being, and immaterial being."
    (MN. 9)
In these three states of being there will be moments of conceiving "I am this", "I am that," and then there will be moments when nothing of the sort is happening.

Best wishes,
Dhammanando Bhikkhu
Greetings Dhammanando

Indeed. I have no disagreement with you.

There is the becoming you have referred to. From becoming arises birth. "I feel lusty" is birth from sensual becoming. "I have attained the first jhana" is birth from material becoming. "I am have attained this immaterial jhana" is birth from immaterial becoming.

I have heard it said satisfaction with material things like money is material becoming and satisifaction with immaterial things like status and fame is immaterial becoming.

I was merely generalising. Becoming & selfing. There is not much difference really. Thus arahantship is described as the end of becoming. It is also described as the end of conceit.
35. "And how is the monk a Noble One who has taken down the flag, put down the burden, become unfettered? He has abandoned the conceit of self, has cut it off at the root, removed it from is soil like a palmyra tree, brought it to utter extinction, incapable of arising again. Thus is the monk a Noble One who has taken down the flag, put down the burden, become unfettered.

MN 22
Kind regards,

Element
Element

Re: A quibble about Buddhadasa's teaching

Post by Element »

Dhammanando wrote:MN. 9 offers no support for your view, for here the three types of sankhāra are named but not defined.
Greetings Venerable Dhammanando

Of course I must happily disagree with you. MN 9 is structured following the links of dependent origination. For me, there is no ambiguity there.

Further, I suggest it not is discussion to negate one view without providing alternative (from the suttas).
Dhammanando wrote:Neither does MN. 44, for here sankhāras are treated in a context that has nothing whatever to do with dependent arising. The sutta is concerned with the gradual pacification of sankhāras by one who enters saññāvedayita-nirodhasamāpatti.
I happily agree & disagree with you. MN 44 and the gradual pacification of sankhāras by one who enters saññāvedayita-nirodhasamāpatti is not dependent arising. However, it has everything to do with dependent nirodha. It is the very quencing or pacification of those sankharas concocted by ignorance and its nutriment the hindrances.

Paticcasummupada has two sides. The side of arising and the side of nirodha. From the quencing of ignorance comes the quencing of sankhara. This is saññāvedayita-nirodhasamāpatti and the prelimary meditations such as calming the kaya-sankhara and calming the citta-sankhara in steps 4 and 8 of the anapanasati sutta.

The very practise of satipatthana is the turning of vinnana inward to contemplate and pacify the sankhara and eventually uproot ignorance.

This however, I have made up myself. I did not refer to Buddhadasa in my last two points.

With metta

Element
Element

Re: A quibble about Buddhadasa's teaching

Post by Element »

Dhammanando wrote:In these three states of being there will be moments of conceiving "I am this", "I am that," and then there will be moments when nothing of the sort is happening.

Best wishes,
Dhammanando Bhikkhu
Venerable Dhammanando

Of the above, I will have to reflect on it. Time for bed. :zzz:

I hope you can provide a more in-depth explanation of what you are referring to.

For example, before death, Buddha entered and departed from all jhanas but this was not 'becoming'.

Good night

Element
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Re: A quibble about Buddhadasa's teaching

Post by mikenz66 »

Hi Robert,
robertk wrote: I picked up a copy of Paticcasamuppada - Practical Dependent Origination by Ven. Buddhadasa Bhikkhu (of Thailand)
...
Thanks for the analysis. I didn't recall books such as "Heartwood of the Bodhi Tree" mentioning such disagreements with the Commentaries. I'll have to go back and read it, and this thread, more carefully.

Metta
Mike
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Re: A quibble about Buddhadasa's teaching

Post by robertk »

The venerable Buddhadasa most severe criticism of the
Visuddhimagga and the teaching of Paticcasamuppada over several lifetimes is that it p59 "is of no use at all because it cannot be practised" . And he feels only momentary death in this life is worth teaching.


Momentary death (Khanika marana) occurs but because of ignorance we don't perceive it. But truly we are utterly different from what we were a second ago - the reason we look and feel approximately the same is because similar conditions arise to replace the mentality and materiality that fell away. At conventional death and new birth the changes are more obvious because different kamma will produce results. Here are some pertinent quotes from teh visuddhimagga to show that there were fully aware of momentary death and could understand it in relation to cnventional death:

QUOTE
XVII 164 "The former of these two states of consciousness is called death (cuti) because of falling and the later is called rebirth because of linking (patisandhara) across the gap separating the beginning of the next becoming". Note that there is no suggestion of the consciousness from the previous life going to the present life. The whole point is to make it clear that that is exactly NOT what happens. 164. "it should be understood that it has neither come here from the previous becoming nor has it become manifest without the kamma, the formations(sankharas), the objective field etc. as cause. An echo , or its like, supplies the figures here; connectedness By continuity denies Identity and otherness"

302. "with formations as condition consciousness(sankhara paccaya vinnana) prevents seeing the transmigration of a self." 280 "consequently, the dependent origination with its twelve factors, revolving within the linking of cause and effect is established as having no beginning"

303 "Ignorance here is 'no theory' and 'wrong theory'
The Commentaries also taught "that the structure of conditions is present not only in a multiple consciousness but also in each single consciousness as well" (see dispeller of delusion and also note 48 of Visuddhimagga). In the Visuddhimagga it is noted that the factor of resultant consciousness does not only refer to rebirth consciousness but also xvii 126 "in the course of an individual existence or continuity" There are several paragraphs about this.

======

Now I want to look at the matter of other worlds, hells and animals and so forth. Venerable Buddhadasa refers to this in paragraph 39 page 14 and suggests that these actually refer to this life. So that "if someone is a state of agitation and anxiety that means that a state of being in hell exists... And these are real hells, more frightful than those hells beneath the ground that eternalists believe in"

As venerable Buddhadasa notes sometimes the buddha used conventional speech (vohara-sacca) and at other times he used speech that refers to actual realities (paramattha sacca). In conventional speech we are now alive and living on the human plane. We see other beings living on another plane - the animal plane. The other planes (hells heavens) mentioned in the texts we do not usually see, hence some people believe that only the human and animal plane exist. Actually, according to the Dhamma, in the truest sense there are no humans, no animals no "us" even. But there are dhammas - ephemeral, conditioned phenomena - arising and passing away. At this time, in this world, those streams of conditioned phenomena include many pleasant moments (intermittently). In some planes pleasant moments are much more frequent and in others much less frequent. In the Salayatanasamyutta 35:135 (p1207 Bodhi translation)- (which Ven. Buddhadasa quotes):


QUOTE
"I have seen, bhikkhus, the hell named 'Contact's sixfold base'. There whatever form one sees with the eye is underdesirable, never desirable; unlovely, disagreaable. whatever sound..whatever taste..whatever odour..whatever tactile object..whatever mental phenomenon one cognises with the mind is undesirable.disagreeable..."

Now, in this world, there are in reality no humans, computers, trees: these are only the shadows of the ultimate dhammas appearing. What appears to eyesense is different colours. Sometimes the moment of seeing is the result of kusala kamma (good kamma) and in that case the object will be pleasing to some degree. At other times, in this plane, the moment of seeing is the result of past akusala kamma- and in that case the object will be unpleasant to some degree. The same for the denizens of hell except that the eye conscious moments are the result of past akusala kamma and hence there is usually no opportunity for pleasant results.

Venerable Buddhadasa suggests that
QUOTE
"If there is stupidity, then the state of being an animal arises..if there is sensual pleasure of various kinds and intensities then one of the heavenly states arise...All of these states are more real than those talked about which will be experienced after entering the coffin."

I think it is true that we can infer to a degree the nature of other existences by understanding those momentary states of mind that arise in this life and so I don't think it is wrong to emphasise this aspect. Bu I believe the Buddha taught the planes of existence with a view to the real nature of the world. I think accepting this doesn't have to make one terrified of future lives or hopeful of heavenly pleasures. I think it acts to force one more onto the present because one knows that life now - which is only seeing, hearing, tasting, touching, thinking etc - is no different from life in the past and it will be just like that in the future. It means one becomes intent on understanding this moment and how the factors of the dependent origination work their ways.
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Re: A quibble about Buddhadasa's teaching

Post by appicchato »

robertk wrote: Sometimes the moment of seeing is the result of kusala kamma (good kamma) and in that case the object will be pleasing to some degree. At other times, in this plane, the moment of seeing is the result of past akusala kamma- and in that case the object will be unpleasant to some degree.
Hi robert,

I wouldn't argue, nor take issue with the above, just to say that I find it a real stretch...might you have a reference?...
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Re: A quibble about Buddhadasa's teaching

Post by cooran »

Hello Ven. Appicchato, all,

You may find Chapter 8 in Abhidhamma in Daily Life by Nina van Gorkom to be of relevance in this matter:
AHETUKA CITTAS
"The Buddha taught that everything which arises must have conditions for its arising. When we see something unpleasant there must be a condition for it: it is the result of akusala kamma. Akusala vipaka cannot be the result of kusala kamma. Seeing something pleasant is kusala vipaka; this can only be the result of kusala kamma. The vipakacitta which arises when there is an unpleasant or pleasant impression through one of the five senses is ahetuka. At that moment there are no akusala hetus (unwholesome roots) or sobhana hetus (beautiful roots) arising with the citta".
http://www.vipassana.info/nina-abhi-08.htm" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

metta and respect,
Chris
---The trouble is that you think you have time---
---Worry is the Interest, paid in advance, on a debt you may never owe---
---It's not what happens to you in life that is important ~ it's what you do with it ---
Element

Re: A quibble about Buddhadasa's teaching

Post by Element »

Pleasant sensation arises from nature, from the elements, not from kamma. For example, I taste sugar. Its sweetness arises from nature, not from karma.

Similarly, arahants still have pleasant and unpleasant feeling but are free from karma.

Also, bad fruit can arise from good action and good fruit can arise from bad action, as stated in MN 136.
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Re: A quibble about Buddhadasa's teaching

Post by meindzai »

Element wrote:Pleasant sensation arises from nature, from the elements, not from kamma. For example, I taste sugar. Its sweetness arises from nature, not from karma.

Similarly, arahants still have pleasant and unpleasant feeling but are free from karma.
They do not create new kamma, but they are still subject to vipaka.

Also, bad fruit can arise from good action and good fruit can arise from bad action, as stated in MN 136.
That's not what the sutta states at all:
Now there is the person who has abstained from killing living beings here... has had right view. And on the dissolution of the body, after death, he reappears in the states of deprivation, in an unhappy destination, in perdition, in hell.12 But (perhaps) the evil kamma producing his suffering was done by him earlier, or the evil kamma producing his suffering was done by him later, or wrong view was undertaken and completed by him at the time of his death. And that was why, on the dissolution of the body, after death, he reappeared in the states of deprivation, in an unhappy destination, in perdition, in hell. But since he has abstained from killing living beings here... has had right view, he will feel the result of that here and now, or in his next rebirth, or in some subsequent existence.13
Bad kamma still creates bad results, good kamma still creates bad results, it's just that there is no way to know at what time those results will take fruit.

-M
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Re: A quibble about Buddhadasa's teaching

Post by Dhammanando »

Hi Element,
Element wrote:Pleasant sensation arises from nature, from the elements, not from kamma. For example, I taste sugar. Its sweetness arises from nature, not from karma.
In the Abhidhamma the fact that the gustatory sensoria get to encounter a desirable ārammaṇa is attributed to kamma.
Similarly, arahants still have pleasant and unpleasant feeling but are free from karma.
Arahants are free in the sense of not creating new kamma, but not in the sense of not experiencing the ripening of old kamma.
Also, bad fruit can arise from good action and good fruit can arise from bad action, as stated in MN 136.
Nonsense. The Mahakammavibhanga Sutta doesn't state this, nor did the Buddha ever teach such a thing. The sutta gives instances of persons performing good actions and experiencing good rebirths, performing bad actions and experiencing bad rebirths, performing good actions and experiencing bad rebirths, or performing bad actions and experiencing good rebirths. In the last two cases these rebirths are not the fruit of those kammas. Rather, the kammas have been prevented from ripening for the time being by the greater weight of other kammas. But this doesn't mean that they'll never ripen or that an evil kamma will give rise to a pleasant vipāka, or vice versa.
  • "Therein, Ananda, as to the person here who kills living beings … and holds wrong view, and on the dissolution of the body, after death, reappears in a happy destination, even in the heavenly world: either earlier he did a good action to be felt as pleasant, or later he did a good action to be felt as pleasant, or at the time of death he acquired and undertook right view. Because of that, on the dissolution of the body, after death, he has reappeared in a happy destination, even in the heavenly world. But since he has here killed living beings … and held wrong view, he will experience the result of that either here and now, or in his next rebirth, or in some subsequent existence.

    [...]

    "Thus, Ananda, there is action that is incapable [of good result] and appears incapable; there is action that is incapable [of good result] and appears capable; there is action that is capable [of good result] and appears capable; and there is action that is capable [of good result] and appears incapable."
A related teaching from the Anguttara Nikāya:
  • "Now take the case when a minor evil deed has been committed by a certain person and it takes him to hell. But if the same minor offence is committed by another person, its result might be experienced during his lifetime and not even the least (residue of a reaction) will appear (in the future), not to speak about a major (reaction).

    "Now what is the kind of person whom a minor offence takes to hell? It is one who has not cultivated (restraint of) the body, not cultivated virtue and thought, nor has he developed any wisdom; he is narrow-minded, of low character and even for trifling things he suffers. It is such a person whom even a minor offence may take to hell.

    "And what is the kind of person by whom the result of the same small offence will be experienced in his lifetime, without the least (future residue)? He is one who has cultivated (restraint of) the body, who has cultivated virtue and thought, and who has developed wisdom; he is not limited by (vices), is a great character and he lives unbounded (by evil).2 It is such a person who experiences the result of the same small offence during his lifetime, without the least future residue.

    "Now suppose a man throws a lump of salt into a small cup of water. What do you think, monks: would that small quantity of water in the cup become salty and undrinkable through that lump of salt?" — "It would, Lord." — "And why so?" — "The water in the cup is so little that a lump of salt can make it salty and undrinkable." — "But suppose, monks, that lump of salt is thrown into the river Ganges. Would it make the river Ganges salty and undrinkable?" — "Certainly not, Lord." — "And why not?" — "Great, Lord, is the mass of water in the Ganges. It will not become salty and undrinkable by a lump of salt."

    "Further, O monks, suppose a person has to go to jail for a matter of a halfpenny, a penny or a hundred pence, and another man does not have to go to jail on that account.

    "Now what is the kind of person that has to go to jail for a matter of a halfpenny, a penny or a hundred pence? It is one who is poor, without means or property. But he who is rich, a man of means and property, does not have to go to jail for such a matter."
    (AN. 3:110)
Best wishes,
Dhammanando Bhikkhu
Yena yena hi maññanti,
tato taṃ hoti aññathā.


In whatever way they conceive it,
It turns out otherwise.
(Sn. 588)
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robertk
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Re: A quibble about Buddhadasa's teaching

Post by robertk »

appicchato wrote:
robertk wrote: Sometimes the moment of seeing is the result of kusala kamma (good kamma) and in that case the object will be pleasing to some degree. At other times, in this plane, the moment of seeing is the result of past akusala kamma- and in that case the object will be unpleasant to some degree.
Hi robert,

I wouldn't argue, nor take issue with the above, just to say that I find it a real stretch...might you have a reference?...
Dear Venerable
From the Dispeller of Delusion(Sammohavinodani) p9-11:
Rupa sadda (visible data, sounds)..there are none which are
disagreeable that are born of profitable kamma; all are agreeable
only....But a disputatious speaker (vitandavadin) said 'There is no
intrinsic agreeable and disagreeable'It is according to the likings
of these or those individuals)[and the vitandavadin goes on to give
an example of how to people in some distant place worms are
considered a delicacy whereas most people find them repulsive , he
also says the same about peacocks flesh].
He should be asked 'But how? Do you say that there is no
distinguishing an object as intrinsically agreeable or
disagreeable?' 'Yes: I say there is not?..
[
it continues a little
more
and then refutes the vitantavadin (sectarian of another school)]

''It is through perversion of perception that the same object is
agreeable for one and disagreeable for another. But there is the
distinguishing of an object as intrinsically agreeable or
disagreeable'.......the elder Tipitaka Cula-Abhaya said: 'The
agreeable and disagreeable are distinguishable according to vipaka
(kamma result) only, not according to javana (impulsion that follows
the vipaka). But it is impulsion through perversion of perception
(sannavipallasa)only that lusts for the agreeable and hates the same
agreeable; that lusts for the disagreeable and hates the same
agreeable. Only by way of vipaka however is it rightly
distinguishable. For resultant consciousness (vipaka citta) cannot
be
mistaken. If the object is agreeable it is profitable result that
has
arisen; if disagreeable, it is unprofitable result that has arisen.
Although those of wrong view on seeing such exalted objects as
the enlightened one(buddha) shut their eyes and feel domanassa
(unpleasant feeling)[arising during the javana stage]and on hearing
the Dhamma they stop their ears nevertheless their eye-consciouness,
ear-consciousness , etc are only profitable kamma result (vipaka).
Although dung eating pigs on smelling the odour of dung become
joyful, thinking;'we shall get something to eat' nevertheless their
eye-consciousness (a vipaka) in the seeing of the dung, nose
consciousness (a vipaka) in smelling its odour and tongue
consciousness (a vipaka)in tasting its flavour is only unprofitable
result.""


------
It is true that often we cannot be sure whether the present vipaka
is
the result of kusala kamma or akusala kamma. And it is not so
important to know - that is why all vipaka is classifiedd as only
one
jati whereas akusala kamma and kusala kamma have a jati each: We
must
learn to distinguish kusala citta from akusala citta.
with respect
Robert
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