Did the Buddha teach we have choice? (aka The Great Free Will v Determinism Debate)

[Modus.Ponens]

I have not read the other thread as it is way too long.

Pure determinism is an inevitable consequence of the principle of causality, which is a principle I think the Buddha thaught. However, only a person completely aware of the laws that run the universe and what the present state of the universe is would be devoid of choice. Anyone who is not in this condition is unable to completely understand the causes that made him act in a way and therefore has the illusion of choice. The conclusion is not that one should not care for one's actions because all is predetermined and choice is an illusion. The conclusion is that we should care for our actions because that illusion is the reality to us and we got to make the best out of our reality.

Good post? If it made sense, maybe it would be, but pure determinism leaves us as leaves blowing in the winds, having no choice. What difference is there in what we do, since what we do is has nothing to do with anything I imagine I want, since imagining that I want anything and can do anything of my own accord is just an artifact, a side effect, of impersonal mechanical cause and effect, meaning there is not a thing I can do? Is that what the Buddha taught?

Hi tilt.

What exactly didn't make sense in my post?

[kirk5a]

The suttas MN19, MN20 are very clear on how the Boddhisatta processed on the path.
Here is another basic/fondamental sutta about yoniso manasikara (translated in this sutta as "appropriate attention" ) : MN2 : Sabbasava Sutta: All the Fermentations. http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

Thank you for this. This is the sutta I had in mind when I mentioned in the previous thread that the Buddha said contemplating "Who or what makes choices" is "inappropriate attention." I would like to highlight that section. As it is such a commonly recommended "method" even by some Buddhist teachers... something to consider. As I said earlier, I tried this way extensively, and quite frankly, it messed me up. For awhile.

"This is how he attends inappropriately: 'Was I in the past? Was I not in the past? What was I in the past? How was I in the past? Having been what, what was I in the past? Shall I be in the future? Shall I not be in the future? What shall I be in the future? How shall I be in the future? Having been what, what shall I be in the future?' Or else he is inwardly perplexed about the immediate present: 'Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? Where has this being come from? Where is it bound?

"As he attends inappropriately in this way, one of six kinds of view arises in him: The view I have a self arises in him as true & established, or the view I have no self... 'This is called a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views....
...
"He attends appropriately, This is stress... This is the origination of stress... This is the cessation of stress... This is the way leading to the cessation of stress. As he attends appropriately in this way, three fetters are abandoned in him: identity-view, doubt, and grasping at precepts & practices. These are called the fermentations to be abandoned by seeing.

[Viscid]

Good post? If it made sense, maybe it would be, but pure determinism leaves us as leaves blowing in the winds, having no choice. What difference is there in what we do, since what we do is has nothing to do with anything I imagine I want, since imagining that I want anything and can do anything of my own accord is just an artifact, a side effect, of impersonal mechanical cause and effect, meaning there is not a thing I can do? Is that what the Buddha taught?

I believe 'choice' and 'determinism' are compatible concepts. We are given choice, and to us, the choices we make are real and have consequence. If we were to believe that we had no say in the matter, then we would be fatalists and do nothing but react. From our perspective there is choice, to a neutral observer (if such a thing exists) there is strict determinism.

Did the Buddha teach that we have a choice? It sure sounds like it.
Does that mean he'd advocate this ill-defined notion of 'free will?' I doubt the Buddha would be so vague.

[Alex123]

Hello All,

In MN35 and SN22.59 (for example) The Buddha defined anatta as 5 aggregates being beyond control. One cannot control any aggregate "let it be thus, let it not be thus". The will, intention, kamma, choice, make up those aggregates (primarily saṅkhāra khandha).

The causes and conditions for 5 aggregates are also Anatta. They too are beyond control. - SN22.20

“Bhikkhus, form is non-self. The cause and condition for the arising of form is also non-self. As form has originated from what is non-self, how could it be self? “Feeling is non-self…. Perception is non-self…. Volitional constructions are non-self…. Consciousness is non-self. The cause and condition for the arising of consciousness is also non-self. As consciousness has originated from what is non-self, how could it be self?
SN22.20 (9) Non-self with Cause BB Trans.

So not only 5 aggregates are anatta, but so are their causes.


There was an article posted by someone where the free will was discussed. An important section there was saying that in cause-effect world there can be free will IF...

Besides the absence of constraint, the compatibilist definition of free will requires also an agent that is capable of monitoring wishes in order to execute actions.

Compatibilist position COULD allow for real choice within cause-effect stream, if and only if there was an Agent above conditionality who could choose.

Buddha denied an agent, Atta. Kamma or intention is caused by contact (AN6.63), not by an Agent or will or some wish. As the Buddha has said about the World: "it is empty of a self or of anything pertaining to a self:" - SN35.85.

There are cause-effect stream, but no Agent above and beyond it to be able to freely chose.


With metta,

Alex

[Alex123]

Hello Mike, Viscid, Tinhtan,

I believe 'choice' and 'determinism' are compatible concepts.

I think M.P. sums the issues up well. I found the article
Federman, Asaf (2010) What kind of free will did the Buddha teach? Philosophy East and West, Vol.60 (No.1). ISSN 0031-8221
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/3142/" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;
that was already referred to on the other thread very interesting (though now my head hurts...). In particular the distinction made between determinism and fatalism...


Mike

But that article that you, and other have posted has a serious flaw. For the possibility of free will within cause-effect nature of the world (compatibilist position), one would require and Agent to choose. This appears to be an attempt at sneaking the Atta into Buddha's teaching. Even the Buddha explained Anatta to be absence of mastery, absence of control.

"Bhikkhus, form is not-self. Were form self, then this form would not lead to affliction, and one could have it of form: 'Let my form be thus, let my form be not thus.' And since form is not-self, so it leads to affliction, and none can have it of form: 'Let my form be thus, let my form be not thus.'
"Bhikkhus, feeling is not-self... "Bhikkhus, perception is not-self... "Bhikkhus, determinations are not-self...
"Bhikkhus, consciousness is not self. Were consciousness self, then this consciousness would not lead to affliction, and one could have it of consciousness: 'Let my consciousness be thus, let my consciousness be not thus.' And since consciousness is not-self, so it leads to affliction, and none can have it of consciousness: 'Let my consciousness be thus, let my consciousness be not thus.'
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .nymo.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

Even putting in conditions and choices would still involve the same aggregates that cannot be controlled as "'Let my aggregates be thus, let my aggregates be not thus.'"

I think the problem comes from the understanding of the anatta. The argument often shown is the "beyond-control" or "out-of-control" or "no-control" aspect of the anatta dhamma. So there is no choice possible.

But this IS what the Buddha has said in SN22.59 and MN35 for example.


With metta,

Alex

[Nyana]

I think the problem comes from the understanding of the anatta. The argument often shown is the "beyond-control" or "out-of-control" or "no-control" aspect of the anatta dhamma. So there is no choice possible.

But this IS what the Buddha has said in SN22.59 and MN35 for example.

It's important to understand the object of negation. SN 22.59 is negating the notion of a permanent Self which is not subject to affliction/dis-ease. It is not negating functional choice. The Self which is being negated in SN 22.59 is a Self which would be:

• 1. permanent
  2. satisfactory
  3. not subject to affliction/dis-ease

This Self is refuted: a permanent, satisfactory Self which is not prone to old age, sickness, and death. As SN 22.59 states:

• Bhikkhus, form... feeling... perception... fabrications... consciousness is not-self. Were form... feeling... perception... fabrications... consciousness self, then this form... feeling... perception... fabrications... consciousness would not lead to affliction/dis-ease.

This criterion of affliction/disease is context for the following statement that:

• none can have it of form... feeling... perception... fabrications... consciousness: 'Let my form... feeling... perception... fabrications... consciousness be thus, let my form... feeling... perception... fabrications... consciousness be not thus.'

This in no way negates functional choice.

All the best,

Geoff

[mikenz66]

I think M.P. sums the issues up well. I found the article
Federman, Asaf (2010) What kind of free will did the Buddha teach? Philosophy East and West, Vol.60 (No.1). ISSN 0031-8221
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/3142/" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;
that was already referred to on the other thread very interesting (though now my head hurts...). In particular the distinction made between determinism and fatalism...

But that article that you, and other have posted has a serious flaw. For the possibility of free will within cause-effect nature of the world (compatibilist position), one would require and Agent to choose. This appears to be an attempt at sneaking the Atta into Buddha's teaching. Even the Buddha explained Anatta to be absence of mastery, absence of control.

Yes, I understand that that is your key disagreement with that article, and other discussion here. But the article makes it clear that the agent is not self and is constrained by conditionality.


Mike.

[Alex123]

Hello Geoff.

You've provided some interesting ideas. In fact your argument seems to be one of the best so far. Thank you.

It's important to understand the object of negation. SN 22.59 is negating the notion of a permanent Self which is not subject to affliction/dis-ease. It is not negating functional choice. The Self which is being negated in SN 22.59 is a Self which would be:

In SN35.193 the Anatta of consciousness is explained as consciousness arising due to causes and conditions. While I certainly do agree that what is dukkha and anicca is also anatta, these are not ALL reasons for something to be Anatta. See SN35.193

If consciousness is dependent on causes, then causes cause it to arise or to cease. That way there is anicca. Causes make it experience painful or pleasant objects. If consciousness could be totally unconditioned by space, time, objects, anything - then it could be permanent. If there was control over consciousness, the it is natural that one would make it to be desired, never undesired.


So I understand that "and none can have it of consciousness: 'Let my consciousness be thus, let my consciousness be not thus." - SN22.59 and MN35 teaching on not being able to wield power over aggregates to include all kind of control. If there was control, then ALL would experience only what they want to experience, not what they don't want. Lack of control on other hand, could lead to unwanted things, which is stressful.

On one occasion Ven. Ananda and Ven. Udayin were staying near Kosambi in Ghosita's Park. Then in the evening, Ven. Udayin emerged from his seclusion and went to Ven. Ananda and exchanged courteous greetings with him. After an exchange of friendly greetings & courtesies, he sat to one side. As he was sitting there, he said to Ven. Ananda, "In many ways the body has been pointed out, revealed, and announced by the Blessed One [with these words]: 'For this reason the body is not-self. Can consciousness in the same way be declared, taught, described, set forth, revealed, explained, & made plain [with these words]: 'For this reason consciousness is not-self'?"
...
Doesn't intellect-consciousness arise in dependence on the intellect & ideas?"
"Yes, friend."
"And if the cause & reason for the arising of intellect-consciousness were to cease totally everywhere, totally in every way without remainder, would intellect-consciousness be discerned?"
"No, friend."
"It's in this way, friend, that consciousness has been pointed out, revealed, and announced by the Blessed One [with these words]: 'For this reason consciousness is not-self.'
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

In MN35

Aggivessana, you that say, matter is your self, do you wield power over that matter, as may my matter be thus, and not otherwise? No, good Gotama.
http://metta.lk/tipitaka/2Sutta-Pitaka/ ... ta-e1.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;
[Alex: same with other aggregates]

Thank you for your post,

With metta,

Alex

[Alex123]

Hi Mike, Geoff, Tilt,

Yes, I understand that that is your key disagreement with that article, and other discussion here. But the article makes it clear that the agent is not self and is constrained by conditionality.

If the so called agent is not self, and is constraint by conditionality, then how is it different from cause-effect stream? Is that agent totally part of cause-effect stream?

If that "agent" is totally part of cause-effect stream, then that agent and the choices are fully and totally conditioned. There is no free will. That agent is like the puppet being moved by conditions. What has happened, has happened in the only possible way that it ever could have possibly happened. That is why it has happened in this as opposed to that way.
If there are conditions for X, then X occurs and never Y.
If there are conditions for Y to occur, then Y occurs, and never X.

Imagine what would be if there were conditions for X to occur, but not-X would occur instead. That acausality and chaos would totally negate the progression along the path because the development of wholesome qualities would not result in permanent eradication of unwholesome tendencies and fetters. If the next moment one could totally revert to what one was before, then sure progression would be impossible.


With metta,

Alex

[Goofaholix]

I think if one were to read some scriptures with a very literal mind then one can make a good case for determinism and that we have no choice.

However I don't think the Buddha intended his teaching to be understood as a collection of doctrines to be believed, rather as a process of awakening to be followed.

So the key for interpreting any teaching is primarily what affect does it have on the process of practising the path to awakening.

Establishing an awareness of all the different causes and conditions that push or pull our decision making process is an important part of awakening, this awareness gives us many more options to choose from, gives us much more freedom to choose what is right.

However to say everything comes down to causes and conditions and therefore we have no real choice to me is the antithesis of what the Buddhist path is trying to achieve, it's downgrading us to the level of animals living on instinct rather than upgrading us to enlightenment where we are no longer slaves to causes and conditions. If that were true Buddhist teaching then I wouldn't choose to be a Buddhist.

[mikenz66]

If that "agent" is totally part of cause-effect stream, then that agent and the choices are fully and totally conditioned. There is no free will.

No-one is saying that there is "free will" in the Cartesian or Upanishadic sense, they are saying that choices are made.

That agent is like the puppet being moved by conditions. What has happened, has happened in the only possible way that it ever could have possibly happened. That is why it has happened in this as opposed to that way.

Yes, but the actions that the agent make, even though conditioned, do affect the future. From the article I quoted.

The fact that there is only one future may seem to imply that reality
controls agents, and that there is no real freedom.
However, Dennett argues, there is a substantial conceptual error in this argument.
Control is something agents do. Reality, not being an agent, does not control anything.
67 Arguments for inevitability usually overlook the fact that the one possible
future already includes the agent’s predictions, considerations, wishes, decisions,
and actions. These are usually inaccessible in advance simply because they are the
agent’s making.

I think a key point is the distinction between determinism and fatalism:

The Buddhist rejection
of [Makkhali’s view that purification happens without cause (hetu) or condition (paccaya)]
is not a rejection of a deterministic theory of causality but a rejection of
fatalism. The confusion between fatalism and determinism lies at the heart of the
above-mentioned objection (that determinism implies that agents are controlled by
causality).

It seems to me that that confusion over these distinctions can lead to a fatalistic attitude that "it's all predetermined so there's no point in trying to do anything". I agree with Goofaholix that this would be a mistake.

Finally, it's worth remembering that:

The Buddhist treatment of free will has to be extracted from the doctrine, as the
doctrine is by no means a systematic philosophical treatise. Nevertheless, it is clear
that the Buddha saw that freedom has a negative correlation with compulsions.
While the Western tradition tends to emphasize external compulsion and social freedom,
Buddhist doctrine tends to emphasize internal compulsions and psychological
freedom.

It is certainly interesting to pursue a philosophical enquiry into the doctrine, but I'm not convinced that it is particularly useful to one's progress. Particularly if the Buddha's instructions for development are misunderstood as encouraging fatalism.


Mike

[Alex123]

I think if one were to read some scriptures with a very literal mind then one can make a good case for determinism and that we have no choice.

Quite the opposite. IMHO it is too easy to read about Buddha and Arahants talking "I go, I think, etc" and forget about 5 aggregates, 12 sense bases, 18 elements, Dependent Origination, Anicca-Dukkha-Anatta and so on.

However I don't think the Buddha intended his teaching to be understood as a collection of doctrines to be believed, rather as a process of awakening to be followed.

Actually it is wisdom that liberates, not ritualistic actions. There were many cases where a non-Buddhist, such as Suppabuddha who stumbled upon a Buddha's lecture and became a stream-enterer in that seat.

have heard that on one occasion the Blessed One was staying in Rajagaha at the Bamboo Grove, the Squirrels' Sanctuary. Now at that time in Rajagaha there was a leper named Suppabuddha, a poor, miserable wretch of a person. And at that time the Blessed One was sitting surrounded by a large assembly, teaching the Dhamma. Suppabuddha the leper saw the large gathering of people from afar and thought to himself, "Without a doubt, someone must be distributing staple or non-staple food over there. Why don't I go over to that large group of people, and maybe I'll get some staple or non-staple food." So he went over to the large group of people. Then he saw the Blessed One sitting surrounded by a large assembly, teaching the Dhamma. On seeing this, he realized, "There's no one distributing staple or non-staple food over here. That's Gotama the contemplative, sitting surrounded by a large assembly, teaching the Dhamma. Why don't I listen to the Dhamma?" So he sat to one side right there, [thinking,] "I, too, will listen to the Dhamma."

Then the Blessed One, having encompassed the awareness of the entire assembly with his awareness, asked himself, "Now who here is capable of understanding the Dhamma?" He saw Suppabuddha the leper sitting in the assembly, and on seeing him the thought occurred to him, "This person here is capable of understanding the Dhamma." So, aiming at Suppabuddha the leper, he gave a step-by-step talk, i.e., a talk on giving, a talk on virtue, a talk on heaven; he declared the drawbacks, degradation, & corruption of sensual passions, and the rewards of renunciation. Then when he saw that Suppabuddha the leper's mind was ready, malleable, free from hindrances, elated, & bright, he then gave the Dhamma-talk peculiar to Awakened Ones, i.e., stress, origination, cessation, & path. And just as a clean cloth, free of stains, would properly absorb a dye, in the same way, as Suppabuddha the leper was sitting in that very seat, the dustless, stainless Dhamma eye arose within him, "Whatever is subject to origination is all subject to cessation."

Having seen the Dhamma, reached the Dhamma, known the Dhamma, gained a footing in the Dhamma, having crossed over & beyond doubt, having had no more perplexity, having gained fearlessness & independence from others with regard to the Teacher's message,
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

Bahiya became an Arahant through listening and deeply understanding Buddha's teaching.

However to say everything comes down to causes and conditions and therefore we have no real choice to me is the antithesis of what the Buddhist path is trying to achieve, it's downgrading us to the level of animals living on instinct rather than upgrading us to enlightenment where we are no longer slaves to causes and conditions. If that were true Buddhist teaching then I wouldn't choose to be a Buddhist.

[/quote]

Suppubuddha the leper was not a Buddhist. He was looking for food and mistook the crowd for people receiving the food. He then decided to listen to the Buddha, and through the lecture he became a stream-enterer.


There are many suttas which talk about understanding of anicca-dukkha-anatta of 5 aggregates, 12 spheres, etc, leading to Awakening.

“Seeing thus[alex: anicca-dukkha-anatta], Sona, the instructed noble disciple becomes disenchanted with form, disenchanted with feeling, disenchanted with perception, disenchanted with volitional constructions, disenchanted with consciousness. Being disenchanted, he becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion (his mind) is liberated. When it is liberated there comes the knowledge: ‘It’s liberated.’ He understands: ‘Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what
had to be done has been done, there is no more for this world.’”
SN22.49 (7) Sona (1) - Ven BB Transl.

Bhikkhus, a bhikkhu sees as impermanent form which is actually impermanent: that is his right view. Seeing rightly, he becomes disenchanted. With the destruction of delight comes the destruction of lust; with the destruction of lust comes the destruction of delight. With the destruction of delight and lust the mind is liberated and is said to be well liberated. [same for other aggregates]
SN22.51 (9) Destruction of Delight (1) - Ven BB Transl.

Again, it is knowledge that liberates.

[Alex123]

Hi Mike, all,

No-one is saying that there is "free will" in the Cartesian or Upanishadic sense, they are saying that choices are made.

If there is no free will, then the choice is fully conditioned and is not due to free-will. Choice and what is chosen occurs, but it arises due to impersonal causes. It is like choice of a leaf being blown by the wind. Except that if one hears the Dhamma and has some wisdom, those conditions will help the process to eventually become liberated. No fatalism here. In fact it is very good that once certain conditions are met, one has no choice but to become Awakened.

Yes, but the actions that the agent make, even though conditioned, do affect the future.

Of course kamma produces kammavipāka. I've never denied this. Wholesome kamma leads to wholesome vipāka, unwholesome kamma leads to unwholesome vipāka.


As for Makkhali Gosala, if we read his views we see that no knowledgeble Buddhist would hold them. Neither I, nor Robert accept the view of Makkhali Gosala below.

'there is no cause, no requisite condition, for the defilement of beings. Beings are defiled without cause, without requisite condition. There is no cause, no requisite condition, for the purification of beings. Beings are purified without cause, without requisite condition.
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

The Makkhali's view above is not determinism. It is more of random chaos. According to the Buddha there are causes for defilement and purification of beings. "Beings are defiled without cause, without requisite condition....Beings are purified without cause, without requisite condition" - this is chaotic fatalism and terrible teaching of Makkhali. It is nothing that I was talking about and has nothing to do with cause-effect conditionality of the Buddha.


With metta,

Alex

[mikenz66]

If there is no free will, then the choice is fully conditioned and is not due to free-will.

You don't seem to be listening. Let me reapeat:
No one is arguing for free will in the usual western or Upanishadic senses.
We are (at least I am) trying to understand the subtleties involved in making sense out of the apparently contradictory concepts of choice and determinism.

Your argument that "things are determined therefore only this particular approach to the Dhamma is correct" makes no logical sense to me. It seems to me a case of trying to use philosophical and logical analysis to filter the practical instructions that the Buddha gave us.


Mike

[Alex123]

Hello Tilt, Mike, all,

If it made sense, maybe it would be, but pure determinism leaves us as leaves blowing in the winds, having no choice.

Is there something wrong with a statement because it doesn't sound life-affirming and nice? Maybe we need to redo the 1st NT. The Truth of Dukkha is just too sad to be taught by the Buddha. And the whole anatta thing is just too soulless. Well, Dhamma is "soulless" path without a heart (passion).

What difference is there in what we do, since what we do is has nothing to do with anything I imagine I want, since imagining that I want anything and can do anything of my own accord is just an artifact, a side effect, of impersonal mechanical cause and effect, meaning there is not a thing I can do? Is that what the Buddha taught?

Kamma produces kammavipāka. Wholesome kamma leads to wholesome vipāka, unwholesome kamma leads to unwholesome vipāka. Wisdom (paññā) leads to wholesome results. Avijjā leads to Dukkha. So it does matter what occurs.

No one is arguing for free will in the usual western or Upanishadic senses.

Good. The the choice is fully conditioned and there is no control over it, or what it will chose. The choice that has been chosen was the only choice possible given that internal/external situation.

Your argument that "things are determined therefore only this particular approach to the Dhamma is correct"

I am not aware of saying that. What I think you may be referring to was my statement like "events happen the only possible way that they could have ever happened given those causes & conditions".


With metta,

Alex