The Dhamma eye: "whatever aising-dhamma cessation-dhamma"

[retrofuturist]

Greetings Tilt,

What I'm saying here is that you don't need to prove or disprove the ontological existence or non-existence of atman or cake.

In looking back over this exchange, I do not see that Mike was trying to do that.

Neither do I. It just seemed a timely opportunity to make the comment for anyone to whom it may be of interest. I know for quite some time I was under the impression the purpose of the anatta teaching was to prove the non-existence of the self - others may have laboured under similar misconceptions too... especially when we sometimes see the term "no-self" bandied around, in place of "not-self".

Metta,
Retro.

[mikenz66]

Hi Retro,

I'm still a bit confused since you appear to be contradicting yourself in this discussion.

The irony here being that I'm trying to point out that concepts are within loka and should be seen and understood accordingly, whilst you're trying to turf them out of the realm of potential engagement (i.e. loka) by saying that "they are not sankharas in the sense of having the three characteristics". Your statement is non-sequitur, and if it ought be directed at anyone, it should be directed towards yourself.

It is habitual for all of us in daily life to hold that the cake is real, and due to avijja, believe that we are seeing and experiencing reality when we see the cake, when all we are experiencing are sankharas. That's all samsaric existence is - sankharas. No cake in loka. The cake is irrelevant - it is beyond range.

To me, my statement that "cake/self/man is a concept" is not significantly different to your statement "not cake in loka". So perhaps I should just leave it there.


Mike

[retrofuturist]

Greetings Mike,

The second statement is regarding (ontological) cake (out there)..... not the "concept" of cake.

Metta,
Retro.

[mikenz66]

Greetings Mike,

The second statement is regarding (ontological) cake (out there)..... not the "concept" of cake.

Metta,
Retro.

Hmm, OK. It's not really worth me saying much more if you think ontology has anything to do with what I've been trying to explain above. We would just be talking at cross purposes.

I've tried to explain how I see the arising of concepts, in a way that I think is quite in line with how Ven Nananda (not to mention the Buddha) explains it. I really don't see much difference between what I've said and what I think you've said, just some minor matters of terminology. You may well disagree, but I probably should just leave it there.


Mike

[tiltbillings]

. . . especially when we sometimes see the term "no-self" bandied around, in place of "not-self".

Looking at the mind/body process there is no self to be found.

[retrofuturist]

Greetings,

Looking at the mind/body process there is no self to be found.

Correct, because all dhammas are not-self.

Metta,
Retro.

[tiltbillings]

Greetings Mike,

The second statement is regarding (ontological) cake (out there)..... not the "concept" of cake.

Metta,
Retro.

Hmm, OK. It's not really worth me saying much more if you think ontology has anything to do with what I've been trying to explain above. We would just be talking at cross purposes.

I've tried to explain how I see the arising of concepts, in a way that I think is quite in line with how Ven Nananda (not to mention the Buddha) explains it. I really don't see much difference between what I've said and what I think you've said, just some minor matters of terminology. You may well disagree, but I probably should just leave it there.


Mike

Rereading this thread I am hard pressed to to see any ontological cake suggested, implied, intimated, hinted at, or directly stated in your msgs

[tiltbillings]

Greetings,

Looking at the mind/body process there is no self to be found.

Correct, because all dhammas are not-self.

Metta,
Retro.

Sure. Depending upon the context either no-self or not-self works without any ontological suggestion.

[acinteyyo]

Hi TMingyur,

An interesting post.
But, in order to write that, you had to use your knowledge of English.
That knowledge must persist somewhere, if not in the mind - then
where?

Hi Vincent,

it is obvious from your post that you believe that knowledge must persist somewhere and it seems you think it persists in the mind. Why do you hold such a view?

If nothing persists in the mind then:

1. Where are your memories when you are not attending to them?

2. Where is your knowledge when you are not attending to it?

This is like asking where the fire has gone after it has gone out. The phrasing of your questions assumes memories and knowledge to be somewhere so that one could possibly be not attending to them, while they still are somewhere somehow. Either someone is conscious of memories or knowledge, then they are here and now or one is not, then there simply aren't any memories or knowledge here and now.

'If the fire burning in front of you were to go out, would you know that "This fire burning in front of me has gone out"?'

'...yes...'

'And suppose someone were to ask you, "This fire that has gone out in front of you, in which direction from here has it gone? East? West? North? Or south?" Thus asked, how would you reply?'

'That doesn't apply, Venerable Gotama. Any fire burning dependent on a sustenance of grass & timber, being unnourished — from having consumed that sustenance and not being offered any other — is classified simply as "out" [nibbuto].'

best wishes, acinteyyo

[retrofuturist]

Greetings Mike,

We would just be talking at cross purposes.

Understood. Being conceptual and inherently based on referents, language certainly has its limitations in any discussion when those concepts and referents themselves are not to be taken as given.



Metta,
Retro.

[pegembara]

It doesn’t mean to say there isn’t a physical world, but what
we can say is that the experience of the body, and the experience
of the world, happens within our mind. It doesn’t happen any-
where else. It’s all happening here. And in that here-ness, the
world’s externality, its separateness has ceased. The word “ces-
sation,” (nirodha), may also be used here. Along with its more
familiar rendition, the word also means “to hold in check,” so it
can mean that the separateness has ceased. When we realize that
we hold the whole world within us, its thing-ness, its other-ness
has been checked. We are better able to recognize its true nature.

This shift of vision is an interesting little meditation tool that
we can use anytime. It is a very useful device because it leads
us to the truth of the matter. Whenever we apply it, it flips the
world inside out, because we are then able to see that this body is
indeed just a set of perceptions. It doesn’t negate our functioning
freely, but it puts everything into context. “It’s all happening
within the space of rigpa, within the space of the knowing mind.”
In holding things in this way, we suddenly find our body,
the mind, and the world arriving at a resolution, a strange real-
ization of perfection. It all happens here. This method may seem
a little obscure, but sometimes the most abstruse and subtle
tools can bring about the most radical changes of heart.

Ajahn Amaro

"I tell you, friend, that it is not possible by traveling to know or see or reach a far end of the cosmos where one does not take birth, age, die, pass away, or reappear. But at the same time, I tell you that there is no making an end of suffering & stress without reaching the end of the cosmos. Yet it is just within this fathom-long body, with its perception & intellect, that I declare that there is the cosmos, the origination of the cosmos, the cessation of the cosmos, and the path of practice leading to the cessation of the cosmos." Rohitassa Sutta

[retrofuturist]

Greetings,

A couple of good finds, pegembara.



... though I'm sure the same point could have been made without reference to rigpa on Ajahn Amaro's part.

Metta,
Retro.

[Dan74]

Probably not in a book which is about a Theravadan view of Dzogchen teachings.

[mikenz66]

Thanks Dan.

See: http://www.forestsangha.org/index.php?o ... jahn-amaro
http://www.forestsangha.org/index.php?o ... &Itemid=25


Mike

[retrofuturist]

Greetings,

Pegembara posted this in another topic and I thought it was worth reproducing here.

The wide gap that exists be­tween the sensory experience of the worldling and that experi­ence the arahant gets through the eye of wisdom. It is the same gap that obtains between the two terms papanca and nip­papanca. In sensory experience, which is based on worldly ex­pressions, worldly usages and worldly concepts, there is a dis­crimination between a thing to be grasped and the one who grasps, or, in other words, a subject-object relationship.

There is always a bifurcation, a dichotomy, in the case of sensory perception. If there is a seen, there has to be some­thing seen and the one who sees. That is the logic. In the Bàhi­ya­sutta, beginning with `in the seen there will be just the seen', the Buddha proclaimed to the ascetic Bàhiya a brief ex­hortation on Dhamma which enables one to transcend the above narrow view point and attain the state of non-prolifera­tion or nippapanca.

There is nothing to see, no one to see, only `a seen' is there. The cause of all these conceptual proliferation, or pa­panca, in the world is contact. The arahants understood this by their in­sight into the fact that the seen, the heard, the sensed and the cognized are simply so many collocations of condi­tions which come together for a moment due to contact, only to break up and get dispersed the next moment.

What is called the seen, the heard, the sensed and the cog­nized are for the worldling so many `things'. But to the wis­dom eye of the arahants they appear as mere conglomerations of conditions, dependent on contact, which momentarily come together and then get dispersed. This insight into the depend­ence on contact, phassam paticca, is the very essence of the law of dependent arising, paticca samuppàda. It is equivalent to seeing the law of dependent arising itself.

In order to transcend the narrow point of view limited to the bases of sense contact or the six sense spheres and realize the state of Nibbàna indicated by the words vinnànam anidas­sanam, anantam sabbato pabham,[2] "consciousness which is non-manifestative, endless, lustrous on all sides", one has to see the cessation of contact.

Nibbana Sermon
Nanananda

Metta,
Retro.

[rohana]

[I realize this is an old thread, but I found this really interesting.. ]

‘yaṃ kiñci samudayadhammaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhamman’ti
"whatever aising-dhamma cessation-dhamma"

It is like writing in water – the experience is of arising and ceasing occupying the same time frame. In this light, perhaps a better rendering would be ‘Whatever is experienced as arising, is experienced as ceasing’; or ‘Any experience of arising is an experience of ceasing,’ the enigmatic ring of which may alert the reader to the profundity of the experience.

This is quite interesting (thanks Mike for starting this thread). I'm not sure whether a translation like "What ever arising-dhammas, they are cessation-dhammas" is linguistically incorrect, but in anycase, the issue here is the time-gap that is conjured up in the mind with the usual translations. May be if we think of the arising and the ceasing as happening simultaneously?

merely a preference for Buddhavacana over speculation and other words.

Well, imo everybody's following what they consider to be either Buddha-vacana or what they see as being in agreement with Buddha-vacana. If we follow this line of thought we could just end with a no-true-scotsman scenario.

Just to remind you though, that I think that it is helpful to recognise that there are concepts (an extreme is "1+1=2") that clearly don't "arise and cease" in the same sense that thoughts about them arise and cease. In that sense they are not sankharas in the sense of having the three characteristics.

I agree with Retro here. May be I have completely misunderstood, but I think this is in fact a repeatedly mentioned point in Bhikkhu Ñāṇānanda's teachings. The old zen question "If a tree falls in the woods and there's nobody to hear it, does it make a sound?" has to be taken seriously here. People think, "even when I'm not looking at this object, it exists" - but this is due to the mistaken idea that there is an observer and an observed. Similarly, the idea that "1+1=2" exists independently comes from the view that the concept "1+1=2" exists somewhere, and that is is being 'observed' or 'grasped' by the mind - or as Ven. Ñāṇānanda puts it, "two ends and a middle". But in fact the concept of "1+1=2" does not exist independently of viññāna. And just like asking "Does this object exist when I'm not looking at it?" is a bogus question, "Does the concept '1+1=2' exist when I'm not thinking it?" is also a bogus question.

And with the dhamma-eye, what is being observed is indeed the process which causes the arising and the ceasing of these objects, the churning of viññāna and nāma-rūpa.

From the Nibbāna Sermons:

Nibbāna Sermons 25:
In the case of the phrase diṭṭhā daṭṭhabbaṃ diṭṭhaṃ na maññati the word diṭṭhā, being in the ablative case, we may render it as "does not imagine a sight worthwhile seeing 'as apart from' the seen". By way of further clarification of this point, we may revert to the simile of the dog on the plank, which we gave in our explanation of nāma-rūpa. The simile, of course, is not canonical, but of fable origin.

When a dog, while crossing a stream, stops halfway on the plank and starts wagging its tail and peeping curiously down, the reason is the sight of its own image in the water. It imagines a dog there, a 'water-dog'. The dog thinks that there is something worthwhile seeing, apart from the seen.

It is unaware of the fact that it is seeing what it sees because it is looking. It thinks that it is looking because there is something out there to be seen. The moment it realizes that it is seeing because it is looking, it will stop looking at its own image in the water.

We have here a very subtle point in the law of dependent arising, one that is integral to the analysis of name-and-form. So, then, due to the very ignorance of the fact that it is seeing because it is looking, the dog imagines another dog, there, in the water. What is called maññanā is an imagining of that sort.
No such imagining is there in the Tathāgata, diṭṭhā daṭṭhabbaṃ diṭṭhaṃ na maññati, "he does not imagine a sight worth seeing as apart from the seen". In short, for him the seen is the be all and the end all of it.

The seen is dependently arisen, it comes about due to a collocation of conditions, apart from which it has no existence per se. Every instance of looking down at the water is a fresh experience and every time an image of the dog in the water and of another looking at it is created. The dog is seeing its own image. Everything is dependently arisen, phassapaccayā, says the Brahmajāla-sutta, "dependent on contact".
Nibbana - The Mind Stilled

[Sylvester]

Hi Mike,

In ‘yaṃ kiñci samudayadhammaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhamman’ti only a verb (atthi - to be) is omitted, a subject is there (kiñci - whatever). But it's nothing uncommon in Pāli as well as in many other languages. The usual translation might sound not so profound but I guess that in order to understand its meaning one has to connect it with specific conditionality and therefore with dependent arising.

Hi Piotr

Might you have been thinking about the auxillary verb hoti instead of atthi?

If so, you're right about its usual absence. The presence of this copula is usually a sign of lateness of that particular redaction.

[pulga]

I agree with Retro here. May be I have completely misunderstood, but I think this is in fact a repeatedly mentioned point in Bhikkhu Ñāṇānanda's teachings. The old zen question "If a tree falls in the woods and there's nobody to hear it, does it make a sound?" has to be taken seriously here. People think, "even when I'm not looking at this object, it exists" - but this is due to the mistaken idea that there is an observer and an observed. Similarly, the idea that "1+1=2" exists independently comes from the view that the concept "1+1=2" exists somewhere, and that is is being 'observed' or 'grasped' by the mind - or as Ven. Ñāṇānanda puts it, "two ends and a middle". But in fact the concept of "1+1=2" does not exist independently of viññāna. And just like asking "Does this object exist when I'm not looking at it?" is a bogus question, "Does the concept '1+1=2' exist when I'm not thinking it?" is also a bogus question.

Nicely put. Another way of looking at it is that if I'm thinking about going to Paris the actual images that I conjure in my mind are only real to the extent that they a part of my "thinking about going to Paris", but my actually being in Paris doesn't exist. We tend to be so captivated by our thoughts that we forget this: the future is taken as real when it's nothing more than imaginary.

In addition, since my thinking about going to Paris has to be done somewhere that I happen to be at, i.e. the here-and-now, what is bodily present to me is just as much a part of my thinking about going to Paris as the images in my mind: the real and the imaginary blend resulting in an illusion grounded on the concrete.

[mikenz66]

Hi rohana,

Just to remind you though, that I think that it is helpful to recognise that there are concepts (an extreme is "1+1=2") that clearly don't "arise and cease" in the same sense that thoughts about them arise and cease. In that sense they are not sankharas in the sense of having the three characteristics.

I agree with Retro here. May be I have completely misunderstood, but I think this is in fact a repeatedly mentioned point in Bhikkhu Ñāṇānanda's teachings. The old zen question "If a tree falls in the woods and there's nobody to hear it, does it make a sound?" has to be taken seriously here. ...

I wasn't referring to questions of reality/existence. I was referring to how, as I understand it, concepts (whether true or false, real or imaginary) are not seen to "arise and cease" in the same way that thought, sensations, and so on do. That's why our concept of self is so hard to shake off...


Mike

[Sylvester]

Ajahn Pasanno's alternate translation: ‘Any experience of arising is an experience of ceasing’ to me sounds a lot like the commentarial descriptions of the experience of rapid arising and dissolution of phenomena.
Mike

Sorry to rake up such an ancient post, but I think this transcendental vision is actually amenable to a very standard grammatical analysis.

yaṃ kiñci samudayadhammaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhammaṃ

I've left out the iti quotation mark, as it adds nothing to the analysis.

First, the structure of the sentence. It is one of those very standard sentences comprising of 2 clauses defined by ya ... ta.... The ya is a relative pronoun, while the ta is the demonstrative pronoun. Here, the pronouns have been inflected into yaṃ ... taṃ. So, it's vitally important to ensure that any literal translation acknowledges this structure by somehow preserving in English the "whatever... that..." pronouns.

Since we have sabbaṃ taṃ, it should be "whatever... all that [is]", where the "ïs"is supplied by the silent copula hoti which is typically not used in suttas. As for yaṃ kiñci, the kiñci just means "something". As such, yaṃ kiñci X, sabbaṃ taṃ Y would literally mean "whatever something [is] X, all that [is] Y". An idiomatic translation would be "änything whatsoever that is X, all that is Y". The ta/that is referring to the subject of the sentence kiñci, as Piotr pointed out.

I think when you finally break down the sentence into its basic structure, it will become patent that the words samudayadhammaṃ and nirodhadhammaṃ are functioning as adjectives or adjectival nouns to predicate the "things" indicated by the pronouns ya and ta. Therefore, the insight can best be translated literally as "Anything whatsoever that is of the nature to arise, all of that is of the nature to cease." All the 4 translations on ATI carry this connotation in one way or another.

I therefore think that Ajahn Pasanno's translation does not really work, since he's made dhamma/experience the subject of the sentence, whereas the subject is something else indicated by the kiñci that has the dhamma/nature as a predicate.

I'm not sure if the Comy explains this in terms of the "momentariness"model, but I found one Comy explanation for the insight -

Dhammacakkhunti sotāpattimaggo adhippeto. Tassa uppattiākāradassanatthaṃ ‘‘yaṃkiñci samudayadhammaṃ, sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhamma’’nti vuttaṃ. Tañhi nirodhaṃ ārammaṇaṃ katvā kiccavasena eva saṅkhatadhamme paṭivijjhantaṃ uppajjati.

The Pali is too difficult for me, but it sounds as if knowledge about conditioned states arise by way of having made cessation the object.